by Axel Bührmann

Introduction:

The passing of the Forty Second Amendment to the Constitution of India in 1976, tribunals became key dramatis personae in the justice delivery system. In order to achieve the objectives of the amendment, which was to ensure speedy disposal of cases, an array of tribunals were set up. These included the Administrative Tribunals, the Rent Control Tribunals and also Tax Tribunals. The constitution and functioning of these tribunals have been controversial and intensely debated. The Constitution of the National Tax Tribunals, through the passing of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 in pursuance of Article 323-B (1) (a). The Act provides a machinery for the adjudication by the National Tax Tribunal of disputes with respect to levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of direct taxes and also to provide for the adjudication by that Tribunal of disputes with respect to the determination of the rates of duties of customs and central excise on goods and the valuation of goods for the purposes of assessment of such duties as well as in matters relating to levy of tax on service. The Act is bound to raise constitutional issues of immense significance as to validity of conferral of the power and functions of the Tribunal, the exercise of such powers and functions, and the concept of judicial review under the Constitution.

The Edict Machinery of Tribunals in India:

The concept and the constitution and functioning of the Tribunals established under Administrative Tribunals Act. The exclusive jurisdiction hitherto have the benefit of by the Tribunals in service matter and distinguish the High Courts was put at stop partially by the Supreme Court of India in its landmark judgment in ‘L.Chandra Kumar Vs.Union of India and others. The Supreme Court diversified and re-distributed the jurisdiction of service matters etc in between these Tribunals for which purpose they have been established and High Courts as per the spirit of the Constitutional mandate enunciated by the framers of the Constitution, keeping in

view the ‘Basic Structure Theory’ and the provisions contained under Article 226,227, 32 and Articles 323 A and 323 B of the Constitution of India.

The salient feature of our Constitutional system that whenever new legislations or enactments are passed, either by Parliament or Legislative Assemblies, it is generally found that, they, being tested in courts of law, either on their validity as a whole or certain provisions of such acts if they are offending any provisions of Constitution, any public policy or established legal principles. Therefore, no exception was shown to the ‘Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, enacted in terms of Article 323 –A of the Constitution of India. Consequent upon the establishment of service Tribunals in the country ‘under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, a string of litigation had erupted before the High Courts of several States and also in Supreme Court, questioning the validity of certain provisions of the Act and also ultra vires of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Firstly, the ‘Apex Court’ by a Five Judge Constitution Bench, headed by the then Hon’ble Chief Justice, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, examined the constitutional validity of Article 323-A and its provisions in S.P. Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of India and others3 said Bench while upholding the validity of Article 323-A, held that the Service Tribunals created under Article 323-A are substitutes to the High Courts and the exclusion of the jurisdiction of High Courts is legal. Thereafter, a seven Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in ‘L. Chandra Kumar case’ while dealing with power of judicial review vested in High Courts and Supreme Court under Articles 226,227 and 32 respectively vis-a-vis Articles 323-A and 323-B not only deviated from the earlier discussion of the Supreme Court in ‘S.P. Sampath Kumar’s case’, but also held that, the Tribunals are supplementary in their role and the power of ‘Judicial Review’ vested in High Courts and Supreme Court under Articles 226, 227 and 32 is an inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and struck down clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B of the Constitution of India to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts and Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 as unconstitutional and also Section 28 of the

‘Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985’ which excludes the jurisdiction of High Courts. The Supreme Court in the above case further held that: “The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a ‘Division Bench’ of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunal will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of ‘first instance’ in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open or litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.” In the same case, when an argument was advanced for the superintendence over the Tribunals by the concerned High Courts, the Supreme Court categorically held as follows: “To this end, it is suggested that the Tribunals be made subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction they fall. We are, however, of the view that this may not be the best way of solving the problem. We do not think that our Constitutional scheme requires that all adjudicating bodies which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts should be subject to their supervisory jurisdiction. If the idea is to divest the High Courts of their onerous burdens, then adding to their supervisory functions cannot in any manner, be of assistance to them”. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in ‘Chandra Kumar’s case'(emphasis furnished supra) this Tribunal is now functioning as a ‘Court of first instance’ like any other Tribunal in the country established under Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. It is also to be noted that the ‘Judicial Review’ propounded by the Supreme court in ‘Chandra Kumar’s case cannot be treated/equated with an ‘Appeal’ in as much as the constitutional exercise by way of ‘Judicial Review’ displayed by the High Courts originated from the ‘Basic Structure Theory’ read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

Appellate provisions under the direct and indirect tax enactments

Aforementioned to National Tax Tribunal, under the direct and indirect tax enactments, appeals on substantial questions of law from the decisions of tribunals such as the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal lies to the High Court.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Under Section 252 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 an appellate tribunal known as Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has been set up which consists of both judicial members as well as Accountant members. This tribunal hears appeals against orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Appeals or the Commissioner of Appeals, as specified in Section 253 of the Act on questions of law as well as questions of fact. Under the direct tax regime, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is the final authority as regards determination of questions of fact. Under Section 260 A of the same Act, an appeal lies to the High Court, from every order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal if the High court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. However, there is also a provision for filing further appeals to the Supreme Court from any judgment of the High Court as specified under Section 261, only if the High Court certifies that the case is fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. In cases where High Court refuses to give such certificate, the aggrieved party has an option to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of Supreme Court through special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, High Courts and the Supreme Court have been given similar powers of hearing appeals in respect of disputes concerning wealth tax under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal Under Section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962 the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) has been constituted which consists of Judicial as well as Technical Members. The Tribunal hears appeals against orders passed by the authorities mentioned in Section 129 A of the Customs Act. It also hears appeals against orders passed by the excise authorities as specified in Section 35 B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Earlier, instead of appeal a reference used to lie regarding questions of law. An appeal lies to the High Court on a substantial question of law against an order passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, under Section 130 of the Customs Act, as substituted by the Finance Bill, 2003. Similar provision has been incorporated in respect of appeals to High Courts under the Central Excise Act, 1944. The tribunal also has appellate jurisdiction in anti-dumping matters and the Special Bench headed by the President of the tribunal hears appeals against orders passed by the designated authority in the Ministry of Commerce. The appeals under the Service Tax are also heard by the tribunal. This tribunal is the appellate authority on matters relating to classification and valuation, with the appeals lying to the Supreme Court in these matters.

The Need for Establishment of National Tax Tribunal in India:

The necessity for uniformity and certainty in the administration of tax laws (both direct and indirect tax laws), appeals or references from the orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal lie with the High Courts, these Courts get flooded with such cases which need considerable time to dispose them. Due to the heavy workload of the High Courts, there is a huge backlog of tax related cases as a result of which huge revenue is blocked in such litigations. This is adversely affecting the national economy. Hence, urgent measures are required to be taken to speed up taxation matters pending

before the High Courts. It may also be noted that there are at present 21 High Courts. Many a time, decisions of the High Courts vary from each other which create uncertainty, delays and problems in the administration of tax matters. Conflict of decisions amongst various High Courts

on the same point of law have the effect of distorting uniformity and give rise to unnecessary appeals to the Supreme Court which results in further delay.

National Tax Tribunal will help in clearing the backlog and mitigating the burden that lie at the doors of High Courts. The constitution of the National Tax Tribunal would relieve the taxpayers from the burden of pursuing the tax disputes for a long period and substantially reduce the workload of different High Courts which could not concentrate and devote as much focus which the complex tax laws presently demand.

Judicial Sovereignty and the National Tax Tribunal

In the Landmark Judgments of the Court in L Chandra Kumar and Sampath Kumar that even if the Tribunals have to play a supplemental role, given the powers that they enjoy, including the power to strike down legislation as ultra vires the constitution, the NTT will have to enjoy Judicial Sovereignty as understood in the Indian constitutional context. Judicial Sovereignty in India always has been a very controversial subject. The judicial pronouncements and the scholastic opinion in this regard, point out different stages at which the independence of the judiciary will have to be assessed. Judicial Sovereignty will include the collective independence of the judiciary from the other branches of the State and also the independence of the individual judges. The first aspect relates to appointment, removal etc whereas, the second aspect relates to matters concerned with security of tenure, salaries and allowance etc. Let us take up these issues in relation to the National Tax Tribunal. The Members and the Chairperson of the National Tax Tribunal are appointed by the Central Government in accordance with the recommendation of a selection committee consisting of the Chief Justice of India or his nominee. Though the other two members in the committee are not from the judiciary, it is submitted that this is sufficient safeguard against executive fiat. In terms of the qualification also sufficient safeguards seem to have been provided. The legislation provides that all members including the Chairperson have sufficient legal qualifications and adequate experience to handle complex matters relating to tax as also maters relating to the vires or otherwise of legislations and administrative actions. More importantly, the method of removal of the member and the Chairperson also has been made sufficiently elaborate to minimize executive interference. Section 11 provides that removal and suspension can take place only in consultation with the Chief Justice and on completion of a formal enquiry. The Chairperson also has been given enough discretion to constitute the benches of the National Tax Tribunal. In terms of salaries and other benefits, the members and the Chairperson have been accorded the same status as that of High Court judges. Also of significance is the fact that these Tribunals have been vested with contempt powers under section 12 of the NTTA, 2005 in addition to certain powers of the Civil Court granted to it in section 16. The legislation also protects actions taken in good faith in the course of discharge of duties by any member, Chairperson or other employee, which also helps in maintaining judicial independence. In all it is submitted that the provisions of the enactment do indeed secure judicial sovereignty.

The Differentiation of National Tax Tribunal and High Courts in India

There is a provision in the Act that may cause adversity to tax-payers. The Act stipulates that an appeal before the NTT can be preferred only if the appellant deposits at least 25 per cent of the tax or duty payable on the basis of the order appealed against. The NTT is also given the discretion to condone this requirement. There is no such stipulation in cases that go before the

high court. Yet another distinction is that no interim order can be passed by the NTT without hearing the other party. No Tribunal constituted under 323A or 323B of the Constitution can ever

oust the jurisdiction of the high court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. The writ jurisdiction of the high court will continue, despite the provision that appeals from the NTT will go to the Supreme Court. The NTT will, therefore, be one more forum working along with the

High court.

The Government makes it appear that there is huge pendency before the various high courts involving fiscal disputes. The truth seems to be that the overall pendency does not exceed 30,000 cases, the maximum being around 10,000 in Mumbai and an equal number in Delhi. Probably, constitution of permanent tax benches in these two High Courts will solve the problem for revenue. The NTT will not be governed by the Civil Procedure Code, though rules of natural justice will apply.

Conclusion

There cannot be fault with the intention of the Government, to reduce the backlog of cases, in proposing the National Tax Tribunal, but the way in which the NTT has been setup raises a lot of concern. Apart from creating multiple and simultaneous structure for the resolution of tax disputes, which will obviously lead to a lot of turmoil, the NTT also faces challenges in the form of allowing Chartered Accounts to appear before it. The enactment seems to fair well in terms of securing the independence of the judiciary but fails the Constitution on account of abridging the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts in relation to the transfer of cases. This is a grave blemish that will have to be rectified. Efficiency arguments for and against the Tribunal can be analyzed or answered only if a systematic and scientific study happens in that regard. The Law Commission must come out with official statistics in this regard. More importantly, we will have to decide whether Tribunals are the best way to deliver justice in relation to tax matters or whether mere creation of exclusive tax benches in the High courts would solve the problem. Vacancies in the High Courts are not filled regularly nor is there a concerted effort at the national level to streamline procedures relating to dispose off pending disputes. The Government has not been able to come up with any realistic presentation statistics of existing tribunals nor has it explained tribunalize the tax administration for the justice further. At least in future, efforts like this, to create an alternative forum and working substitute for the Court must be backed with methodical study, more debates and comprehensive planning, in order to guarantee that they do not end up as unproductive outlay at the hands of the exchequer.

Bibliography:

1) Durga Das Basu- Shorter Constitution of India- Thirteenth Edition 2001 Wadhwa Nagpur.

2) H.M.Seervai-Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary- Universal Law Publishers

3) Walter W. Brudno- Taxation in India-Harvard Law School International Program in Taxation.

4) The National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005- Bharatgazette Government of India.

5) The National Tax Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 2007- Manupatra Bare Act.